CIA Director John Brennan considering sweeping organizational changes
A man crosses the Central Intelligence Agency logo in the lobby of CIA Headquarters in Langley, Va. (Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)
The proposal would essentially replicate the structure of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and other similar entities in the agency — an idea that reflects the CTC’s expanded role and influence since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
U.S. officials emphasized that the proposal is in its preliminary stages, and could still be scaled back or even discarded. Already the idea has encountered opposition from current and former officials who have voiced concern that it would be too disruptive and might jeopardize critical capabilities and expertise.
But if Brennan
moves forward, officials said, the changes would be among the most
ambitious in CIA history — potentially creating individual centers
focused on China, Latin America and other regions or issues for which
personnel are now dispersed across difference parts of the agency.
“It’s
a major deal,” said a former senior CIA official who has worked with
Brennan. Asked for an example of a previous reorganization that was
similar in scale, he replied, “I don’t think there has been one.”
Brennan
appointed an internal CIA committee in September to evaluate the
proposal as part of a broader review of the agency’s structure. In a
message to the agency’s workforce, he cited the “rising number and
complexity of security issues” such as the continued threat of al-Qaeda,
civil war in Syria and Russia’s incursions in Ukraine.
“I
have become increasingly convinced that the time has come to take a
fresh look at how we are organized as an agency and at whether our
current structure, and ways of doing business, need adjustment,” the
message said, according to portions that were obtained by The Post.
Brennan did not delineate any specific
plans, but he expressed concern that existing divisions undermine the
CIA’s effectiveness at a time when “the need for integration has never
been greater” and more of the agency’s missions “cut across our
organizational boundaries.”
Former
officials said Brennan’s interest in organizational change is driven in
part by frustration with the struggle to strengthen U.S. intelligence on
the crisis in Syria, which has morphed from a civil war to an incubator
for terrorist groups.
CIA spokesman Dean
Boyd said the in-house panel was asked to conduct a wide-ranging review
and is expected to report back with “recommendations on whether any
changes should be made and, if so, what needs to be done.” The review is
ongoing, Boyd said, and “the officers have not yet put forth their
findings.”
CIA veterans, including several
who have met with the panel, affirmed that it was given wide latitude
with no expectation that it would endorse Brennan’s idea. Nevertheless,
they said the panel’s work is clearly centered on evaluating the major
realignment envisioned by Brennan.
“This
definitely started with a vision he had,” said a former senior U.S.
intelligence official who worked with Brennan. Like others, the former
official spoke on the condition of anonymity, saying he was not
authorized to discuss internal CIA deliberations.
At
issue is a basic structure that has been in place since the agency’s
inception, with employees divided by function among four major
directorates. The best known are the National Clandestine Service, which
sends case officers overseas on spying missions and carries out covert
operations, and the Directorate of Intelligence, which employs thousands
of analysts whose main job is to provide insight on global developments
to President Obama and other policymakers. Others include a directorate
focused on science and technology, and a fourth handles logistics for
operations abroad.
Many
of the agency’s components have been reorganized and renamed
repeatedly. The Directorate of Intelligence, for example, was almost
completely revamped during the early 1980s to eliminate offices that
focused on politics and economics, replacing them with units modeled on
the geographic divisions used in the clandestine service.
But
the idea being explored by Brennan would go beyond such changes,
rebuilding its sprawling bureaucracy around a model that relies on
“centers” that combine analysts, operators, scientists and support
staff. The agency has for years employed that approach on its most
daunting assignments, including efforts to slow the spread of narcotics,
illicit weapons and nuclear arms.
The
trend has accelerated over the past decade, embodied by the massive
growth of the Counterterrorism Center. With thousands of employees, a
presence in dozens of countries and its own fleet of armed drones, the
CTC, as it is known, has come to be regarded as an agency unto itself.
Many
attribute the CTC’s success against al-Qaeda to its fusion of
disciplines, with analysts who have detailed knowledge of terrorist
networks working directly with the operators charged with dismantling
them.
“It is a formula that has worked to
create focus and extraordinary energy” against al-Qaeda and other
important targets, said former CIA director Michael V. Hayden, who
recently met with Brennan’s committee to discuss the reorganization
plans. “The challenge is organizing the entire agency along those
lines.”
Hayden
said he warned the panel against going too far in dismantling the
directorates without having a clear plan for how the agency will replace
what they have done for decades: recruit and train analysts and case
officers with highly specialized skills, cultivating careers and
expertise with a focus on the long term.
Hybrid
organizations such as the CTC tend to be “consumed with the operational
challenges of the moment,” Hayden said. “But you also have to pay
attention to creating the basic skills, knowledge and databases” — areas
of tradecraft that have been the domain of traditional directorates.
Others
cited additional concerns, including the potential for analysts’
judgment to be clouded by working so closely with the operations side.
“The potential for corruption is much greater,” said a former U.S.
intelligence official who worked at the CTC. “If you have analysts who
are directly involved in helping to guide operations, there is the
possibility for them to get too close to the issue and be too focused on
trying to achieve a certain outcome.”
Still,
several CIA veterans said that risk can be managed and more than offset
by other advantages that come from melding analysts with operatives.
Doing so can give analysts deeper understanding of the motivations and
reliability of sources. Trained to be skeptics, analysts can also help
case officers see flaws in operational plans.
Such collaboration proved critical in the search for Osama bin Laden and has given rise to an expanding career category
for analysts known as “targeters” who help identify individuals for the
clandestine service to recruit, apprehend or, in extreme cases, kill.
Agency
veterans, however, have been divided on whether creating new centers
would lead to meaningful intelligence gains on more traditional subjects
including Russia and China.
Boyd declined
to identify who had been appointed by Brennan to the panel, or even say
how many people were on it. Others said it includes about a dozen
senior CIA executives from across its directorates. It is “a cross
section of senior officers,” a U.S. official said.
In
addition to Hayden, the group has met with other former high-ranking
CIA officials including former acting director Michael Morell and former
deputy director Stephen Kappes. Both declined requests for comment.
Greg Miller covers the intelligence beat for The Washington Post.